The 2004 presidential race in Ukraine ranks amongst the most bitter and protracted elections in recent memory. Ballot fraud, massive street demonstrations, assassination attempts and meddling superpowers – this crisis featured them all.

When Viktor Yushchenko was finally inaugurated as President on 8 January this year – still bearing facial disfigurement from the dioxin poison attack unleashed by his political rivals – there was relief that no blood had been spilt.

For several weeks, Ukraine had been poised at the brink of catastrophe. The first round of voting on 31 October incurred the condemnation of international observers for vote rigging designed to back Viktor Yanukovich, favoured by the outgoing regime to safeguard their Russian-leaning interests. However, this episode proved to be a mere portent of the coming crisis.

The 21 November run-off against Yushchenko was so marred by claim and counter-claim of electoral fraud that they could not call a conclusive result. The resulting standoff left the country in political limbo.

To convey their protest against the election’s democratic deficiency, opposition supporters brought the capital, Kiev, to a virtual standstill. In response, the Russian-speaking eastern regions threatened secession if this ruckus continued.

After seventeen tense days of sustained protest, the Ukraine’s Supreme Court agreed to a complete rerun of the ballot for 26 December, and to clamp down on the sources of election fraud. This repeat run-off installed Yushchenko into power. By forcing a legal resolution to the crisis, it would appear that people power had won the day.

The ‘Orange Revolution’ – named after the colour adopted by opposition supporters – was a breathtaking spectacle. From the youngest child to the oldest babushka, the people came in their thousands to Kiev’s Independence Square, establishing a residency that braved sub-zero temperatures and lasted the entire duration of the crisis.

Opposition politicians delivered rousing rhetoric to the crowds, and rock bands kept them entertained. A network of tents pitched on the streets and populated by students added to the effect. Always vociferous but never violent, these demonstrators had seemingly overturned the corruption of the old regime through sheer effort of will.

The spontaneity of the popular reaction was certainly thrilling, but the opposition also displayed a slick professionalism in orchestrating the revolution. A gigantic stage resplendent with booming PA and massive screens had been rolled onto the square, accompanied by rows of portoloos and tables of hot food. Contingency planning had clearly taken place well before the crisis began. Once the crowds had rolled onto the streets, every effort was expended to keep them there.

And so suggestions that the revolution was not entirely indigenous have gained credence. Financial backing from the US is reported to have reached £58 million, with much of this funnelled through ‘democracy promotion’ schemes aimed at Ukrainian civil society organisations. Opposition web sites and radio stations were also bankrolled.

Expert advice was delivered on every aspect of campaigning, from devising memorable election slogans to putting on street entertainment that would engage the youth. Prior to the election, US stalwarts Henry Kissinger and George Bush senior were wheeled out for personal visits. The democratisation of Ukraine evidently occupied a position on Washington’s private ‘to-do’ list.

In complete contrast, Russian support of Yanukovich was entirely public. President Putin made several high-profile visits during the elections to declare his unequivocal endorsement of Yanukovich on national television. Moscow was keen to see their man take the helm in Ukraine, and exercised all the political influence it could muster.

As the dust settles after the election crisis, the extent of the US-Russian tug of war has become apparent. Motivations for interference are obvious given Ukraine’s geo-strategic significance – it is the largest country wholly in Europe, and in the wake of Polish EU accession, has become western Russia’s final buffer. However, did either power have any right to dabble in Ukraine’s election, and did their meddling exacerbate or even cause the crisis that engulfed the country?

The image of brave Ukrainians standing against the corrupt old regime instantly seduced the western media. It was, however, a one-sided spin on events. Ukraine truly is a divided nation. Although Kiev hogged the limelight, a comparable percentage of Ukraine’s 47 million inhabitants were looking eastwards for protection of their overwhelmingly industrial livelihoods, and of their linguistic and cultural heritage.

Characterising Russian actions as imperialistic also came instinctively to the west. Yet given the geographical importance of this massive neighbour, the considerable economic stakes and the sizeable Russian population, how can one fault Moscow’s concern with Ukraine’s fate? Indeed, its concerns are far more understandable than that of the US, which is over 4000 miles away.

However, while Moscow’s interference was clumsy and obvious, Washington’s was sophisticated and subtle. For example, crucial to provoking widespread public protest was ensuring the opposition media enjoyed a monopoly on disseminating early exit polls. When officially announced results began to diverge from these exit polls, it was easy to cry foul.

Electoral interference has firmly entrenched itself in the US foreign policy arsenal. Bush’s State of the Union Address spelled out that democratisation was the principle aim of US foreign policy. In order to achieve this, deploying election advice is clearly a far cheaper modus operandi than deploying marines.

Election interference had helped to depose Milosevic in 2000 and Shevardnadze in 2003 – although it failed in Belarus in 2001 and Zimbabwe in 2002. One needs only read How to Oust the World's Last Dictators by 2025, by former US diplomat Mark Palmer, to understand the mindset behind using ‘soft’ American power in this way, and how US embassies have acted as funnels for this kind of activity around the world.

Despite the pertinence of such debates, only the coldest hearted cynic would turn their nose up at the exemplary conduct of the Ukrainian people. Their desire for democracy was entirely genuine, as was the election fraud that took place in sporadic clumps throughout the country. However, support for Yanukovich in the east was equally genuine. The greatest hope now is that President Yushchenko develops policies that are nationally inclusive. In choosing Moscow as the destination for his first state visit, he would appear to be well aware of this.

One can picture the Washington’s old cold warriors slapping each other backs for ‘winning’ Ukraine. Their containment of Russia is continuing, albeit it in a more benign fashion than the preceding strategy of threatening nuclear annihilation.

A new domino theory has emerged: the authoritarian governments of Belarus, Moldova and even Russia will feel the ripples of the Orange Revolution as their own electorates and opposition groups feel emboldened by Ukraine’s new course. Only time will tell whether Ukraine will act as regional engine for regime change – language so commonly associated with a very different part of the globe.